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parties. The purpose of this article is to analyse the origins and implications of this situation and 
respond to the lack of research in this field, through both legal analysis and preliminary original 
research conducted in collaboration with NGOs working with asylum-seekers in the region. The 
author argues that this practice, which has recently received attention due to the Snowden case, 
leads to unfairness in adjudication and to the use of asylum as a foreign policy tool, 
consequently breaching both universal and regional legal obligations. 
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Introduction 
In August 2012 the world was introduced to the strange realm of asylum
1
 in Latin America, in 
which the institutions of diplomatic and territorial asylum intertwine. Julian Assange, founder 
of the Wikileaks website, lost his bid before the UK Supreme Court to stop his extradition to 
Sweden
2
, where he was under investigation for alleged sexual offences. Fearing this was a 
ruse to allow his eventual transfer to the United States for punishment for revealing classified 
information, he sought protection at the Ecuadorean Embassy in London, where he was later 
granted diplomatic asylum
3
, sparking a row between both nations. As of early 2014, he 
continues to reside within the embassy, surrounded by both members of the press and UK 
security officers. 
 
A few months later Edward Snowden, an analyst in the intelligence sector in the 
United States, leaked documents that allegedly proved that the Government was engaged in 
continued efforts to spy on its citizens and allied nations. These disclosures caused 
considerable domestic and diplomatic embarrassment for the U.S., and charges were brought 
against him. After fleeing to Russia, it was revealed that he was seeking asylum in Ecuador, 
causing tension between the three countries
4
 and opening a new window into the generally 
secretive relation between asylum and foreign policy in Latin America.  
 
Having received the request, the Ecuadorean Ambassador in Washington issued a 
statement declaring that the asylum request would be reviewed ‘responsibly’, as its ‘legal 
basis’ should be ‘rigorously established’ in accordance to his State’s human rights obligations 
and other relevant national and international norms.
5
 A few days later, however, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs noted during a press conference that when deciding whether to grant 
Snowden asylum he would take into account his country’s relationship with the United 
States.
6
 Ecuador ultimately declared it would not offer Snowden asylum after hinting at the 
fact that the situation was being controlled by Assange.
7
  
                                                 
1
 A working definition for the purposes of this article is that ‘Asylum can be considered to relate to the provision 
of protection to refugees who reach the territory of that state’ (Gil Loescher and Alexander Betts (eds.), 
Refugees in International Relations (OUP 2011), 27). A similar definition is provided in (Institut de Droit 
International, ‘L’asile en droit international public (à l’exclusion de l’asile neutre)’ [1950] 43 (II) AIDI, 375). 
The general term covers several forms of international protection and is understood to include admission and 
legal permanence in the host country and protection from return to the country of origin (Roman Boed, ‘Right of 
asylum’ [1994] 5 (1) Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L 1, 3). 
2
 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22. 
3
 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, ‘Declaración del Gobierno de la República del 
Ecuador sobre la solicitud de asilo de Julian Assange’ (16 August 2012) 
<http://www.webcitation.org/69xdGRSLN> accessed 31 July 2013. 
4
 Renee Montagne, ‘For Edward Snowden, a convoluted path to possible asylum’ National Public Radio (24 
June 2013) <http://www.npr.org/2013/06/24/195172970/for-edward-snowden-a-convoluted-path-to-possible-
asylum> accessed 31 July 2013. 
5
 Embassy of Ecuador to the United States, ‘Statement by Ambassador Efrain Baus, Chargé d’Affaires A.I., on 
asylum request by Edward Snowden’. (Washington, 26 June 2013) <http://www.ecuador.org/blog/?p=2999> 
accessed 27 June 2013. 
6
 David M. Herzenhorn and Rick Gladstone, ‘Ecuador Hints at Slow Process on Snowden Asylum’ New York 
Times (New York, 27 June 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/world/snowden.html?hpw> accessed 27 
June 2013. 
7
 Rory Carroll and Amanda Holpuch, ‘Ecuador cools on Edward Snowden asylum as Assange frustration grows’ 
The Guardian (London, 28 June 2013) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/28/edward-snowden-
ecuador-julian-assange> accessed 9 July 2013. 
5 
 
A few days later, Evo Morales, the Bolivian president, stated during a visit to Moscow 
that he was considering granting Snowden asylum. After the visit ended and while he was 
flying back to Bolivia, his aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing in Austria after 
several European countries denied access to their airspaces, having been informed that 
Snowden was on board. After the plane was inspected and the rumours proved to be 
unfounded, president Morales denounced the situation as an ‘aggression’ and later stated that, 
‘in just protest’ he would ‘now grant asylum to that North American persecuted by his 
compatriots. We have no fear’8. Echoing his call, the Venezuelan president, taking a cue from 
his predecessor’s ‘anti-imperialistic’ rhetoric, offered Snowden asylum to shield him from 
‘persecution from the empire’9. 
 
These declarations, and the media frenzy that followed them, offered an insight into 
the world of asylum adjudicators in Latin America, a field that has received little attention 
from scholars in the field of forced migration studies. But most of all, they demonstrated in a 
very crude way how territorial asylum, which should be apolitical and humanitarian
10
, is 
tainted by foreign policy concerns in the region – an unsurprising conclusion considering the 
role of diplomatic bodies in adjudicating claims. 
 
Without diminishing the personal drama behind his story, Snowden is just one man, 
and the diplomatic calculations that lie behind a State’s decision to deny or grant asylum also 
affect thousands of asylum-seekers in the region each year. Most of their claims do not 
benefit from the oversight of the media, or in many cases, any oversight at all. This paper will 
demonstrate that the Snowden case is but a well-publicised example of a systematic issue that 
affects asylum-seekers in the region and exposes them to arbitrary decision-making, denying 
them the essential right of being heard by an impartial adjudicator. 
 
To this effect, Chapter I will give a short introduction to the intricacies of decision-
making in asylum claims and the difficulties inherent to this form of adjudication. Chapter II 
will briefly outline the current state of international protection in Latin American countries, 
identify those where diplomatic authorities play a role in the process, and analyse the 
evolution and origins of this institutional design. Building on these premises, Chapter III will 
show that a) diplomatic asylum has adversely affected the region’s approach to other forms of 
international protection, before moving to demonstrate that b) the identity of the decision-
maker affects impartiality, and that c) foreign policy considerations further diminish 
impartiality.  
 
Therefore, it is contended that a decision-maker that has been traditionally linked to 
diplomatic asylum and that is in charge of a State’s foreign affairs is extremely prone to 
partial decision-making, prioritising foreign policy goals over the individual merits of a case. 
This hypothesis is supported by preliminary original research conducted with the 
collaboration of NGOs in the region. In light of the above, Chapter IV argues that this 
outcome is contrary to international human rights obligations, including those contained in 
                                                 
8
 Translated from Spanish by the author (El Día, ‘Morales dice que "como justa protesta ahora daremos asilo" a 
Snowden’ El Día (Buenos Aires, 6 July 2013) <http://www.eldia.com.ar/edis/20130706/Morales-dice-como-
justa-protesta-ahora-daremos-asilo-Snowden_-20130706152518.htm> accessed 9 July 2013). 
9
 Daniel Arkin and F. Brinley Bruton, ‘Venezuela: Snowden has until Monday to respond to asylum offer’ CNBC 
(7 July 2013) <http://www.cnbc.com/id/100868360> accessed 31 July 2013. 
10
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 
UNTS 137 (1951 Refugee Convention). 
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the Inter-American regime, and Chapter V offers legal and policy recommendations to correct 
this situation. 
 
I. The importance of ‘getting it right’ in asylum adjudication 
Evaluating the impact of foreign policy on asylum claims implies, first and foremost, 
recognizing that it occurs in a particularly complex context. Indeed, adjudication of asylum 
claims is held to be one of the most difficult forms of legal decision-making
11
. Claimants are 
necessarily foreigners and in many cases fail to understand the language, culture and legal 
system of their host country. Additionally, due to the fact that their migration was forced, they 
often exhibit psychological trauma
12
 that may impact even their ability to recall the facts that 
led to their flight
13
 and generally have little or no evidentiary support to back their claims.  
 
This, in turn, leaves a wide margin of consideration to the decision-maker, who must 
rely on third party sources to corroborate the information he or she is provided with and on a 
personal evaluation of the claimant’s credibility, in which translation can make a considerable 
difference. It is only after clearing these hurdles that he or she can approach domestic and 
international norms and try to apply them. For all of these reasons, an extreme burden of care, 
diligence and professionalism is placed upon the decision-maker
14
 if he or she is to come to a 
fair decision that adequately upholds the law and addresses the individual needs of the 
applicant. Consequently, 'the importance of ‘getting it right’ cannot be overestimated'.15 
  
 The two essential prerequisites for this to happen are, obviously, the existence of a 
relevant norm and a procedure to determine whether it is applicable to an individual case. 
Regarding the first requirement, it seems only natural that a State is bound to decide strictly 
within the international and national norms to which it has subscribed
16
. The procedure to do 
so, namely, Refugee Status Determination is open for debate, as the 1951 Convention
17
 and 
its Protocol
18
 are silent on the matter, giving each State the discretion to establish the 
procedure and the decision-maker as it sees fit
19
. Decision-making in other forms of 
international protection, such as complementary protection and non-refoulement in cases 
where there is a risk of torture, has been largely integrated into mechanisms for refugee 
protection, and is therefore also affected by the lack of treaty-level procedural standards
20
.  
                                                 
11
 Cécile Rousseau, Francois Crépeau, Patricia Foxen and France Houle, ‘The complexity of determining 
refugeehood: a multidisciplinary analysis of the decision-making process of the Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee Board' [2002] 15 (1) JRS 43. 
12
 Jane Herlihy and Stuart W. Turner, ‘The psychology of seeking protection’ [2009] 21 (2) I.J.R.L. 171. 
13
 Hilary Evans Cameron, ‘Refugee status determinations and the limits of memory’ [2010] 22 (4) I.J.R.L. 469. 
14
 Advocates also play a substantial role in making sure international norms are brought down to national 
contexts and properly applied to individual cases (Jacqueline Babha, ‘Internationalist gatekeepers? The tension 
between asylum advocates and human rights’ [2002] 23 Immigr. & Nat'lity L. Rev. 159). 
15
 Brian Gorlick, ‘Improving decision-making in asylum determination’ [2005] New Issues in Refugee Research 
Working Paper No. 119, UNHCR/EPAU, Geneva, 3. 
16
 Danièle Joly, Heaven or Hell: Asylum policies and refugees in Europe (Macmillan 1996). 
17
 1951 Refugee Convention (n 9). 
18
 Protocol relating to the status of refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 
UNTS 267 (Refugee Protocol). 
19
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees’ [1992]. See also UNHCR 
‘Note on determination of refugee status under international instruments' (24 August 1977); Guy S. Goodwin-
Gill and Jane McAdam, The refugee in international law (3
rd
 edition, OUP 2007), 54. 
20
 With notable exceptions, such as the Common European Asylum System (Commission (EC), ‘Green paper on 
the future Common European Asylum System’ COM (2007) 301 final). 
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 Evidently, this leads to different approaches and different conclusions across 
jurisdictions and even within them, and makes consistency difficult. When all of these factors 
are considered, the result is that a disproportionate amount of discretion is granted to the 
adjudicator, and therefore who he or she is has a direct impact on the decision: asylum is in 
the eye of the beholder. Nowhere is this truer than in Latin America. 
II. The decision-maker in Latin America 
As States are presumed to have the faculty to establish their own procedures for determining 
protection needs
21
, there are many different institutional arrangements across the globe. Some 
States have supported independent government agencies or court systems, while others have 
established international protection sections within their immigration agencies.  
 
Yet other States, especially in Latin America, have established their asylum 
adjudication system within their Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MOFAs) – as in the case of 
Colombia
22
, Ecuador
23
, Paraguay
24
 and Uruguay
25
 – or as a collective organ where members 
from different agencies, including a representative of the MOFA, are seated – as in the case 
of Argentina
26
, Bolivia
27
, Brazil
28
, Chile
29
, Costa Rica
30
, Guatemala
31
, Nicaragua
32
 and 
Panama
33
. Belize
34
 and Honduras
35
 are the only States in the region with a system where the 
decision is taken by a body that is completely isolated from the MOFA. Lastly, Mexico has an 
independent system where the MOFA provides an opinion on the case
36
 and El Salvador has a 
sui generis two-man committee headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
37
 that places it 
closer to the second group. Guyana is not a party to the universal instruments and does not 
have any domestic procedure in place.   
 
The following table summarizes the current adjudicatory systems in the region: 
 
Table 1. Institutional design in asylum adjudication in Latin America 
 
Institutional arrangement States 
GROUP A: 
Asylum adjudication within MOFA 
 
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay 
GROUP B: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
                                                 
21
 UNHCR Handbook (n 19) 189. See also James C. Hathaway, ‘A reconsideration of the underlying premise of 
refugee law’ [1990] 31 (1) Harv. Int’l. L. J. 163. 
22
 Decreto 4503 de 2009. 
23
 Decreto 1182 de 2012. 
24
 Ley No. 1938 de 2002. 
25
 Ley No. 18.076 de 2007. 
26
 Ley No. 26.165 de 2006. 
27
 Ley de refugio No. 251 de 2012 and Decreto Supremo No. 1440 de 2012. 
28
 Lei No. 9.479 de 1997. 
29
 Ley No. 20430 de 2010 and Decreto 837 de 2011. 
30
 Ley No. 8764 de 2009. 
31
 Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 383 de 2001. 
32
 Ley No. 655 de 2008 de protección a refugiados. 
33
 Decreto Ejecutivo No. 23 de 1998. 
34
 1991 Refugees Act. 
35
 Decreto-Ley No. 2008 de 2003. 
36
 Ley sobre refugiados y protección complementaria, 2011. 
37
 Decreto 918 de 2002. 
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Asylum adjudication outside MOFA but with 
MOFA participation or direction 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama 
GROUP C: 
Asylum adjudication independent of MOFA 
 
Belize, Honduras 
 
For the purposes of this study, I have focused on Group A and Group B States, as the direct 
involvement of diplomatic authorities suggests that they have a higher risk of having 
diplomatic interests interfere in decision-making. The available evidence indicates that there 
is no significant difference between these two groups when it comes to the impact on 
individual cases, but the question is certainly open for further research. 
 
From this data it is apparent that the overall trend in Latin America is a prevalence of 
direction or involvement of the MOFA in determining eligibility for the different forms of 
international protection. As the next chapter will illustrate, this may be explained due to a 
regional tradition of relying on diplomatic asylum (a term interchangeably used with political 
asylum in Latin America) as a means of international protection
38
, a practice that predates 
International Refugee Law (territorial asylum)
39
. Under this figure, a State protects a third-
party national (the asylee
40
) from persecution by his State due to political offences through 
the use of its diplomatic organs, in a decision of a political nature
41
. The intertwining between 
both institutions – which are guided by different principles and follow very different 
objectives – considerably weakens territorial asylum. 
III. The eye of the beholder: The role of the decision-maker and foreign 
policy 
Having analysed the institutional design that is prevalent in Latin America, I will 
proceed to study the three factors that affect impartial decision-making in the region: the 
influence of the tradition and mind-set behind diplomatic asylum, the role that the decision-
maker plays in the outcome of a case, and the effect of foreign policy considerations. All of 
these components have led to a system that strongly privileges foreign policy interests over 
the needs of international protection. 
 
i. The intersection with diplomatic asylum 
 
One of the main factors that reduce the impartiality of asylum adjudication in the 
region is its tradition of relying on diplomatic asylum and the institutional design that makes 
it possible. This tradition can be clearly noted when studying the regional and sub-regional 
instruments on diplomatic asylum, such as the 1889 Treaty on International Criminal Law 
(Tratado de Derecho Penal Internacional)
42
, the 1928 Convention on Asylum (Convención 
                                                 
38
 Francisco Galindo Vélez, ‘El asilo en América Latina: Uso de los sistemas regionales para fortalecer el 
sistema de protección de refugiados de las Naciones Unidas’ in ACNUR, La protección internacional de 
refugiados en las Américas (ACNUR 2011) 173. See also Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 
Informe anual 1981-1982, Cap. VI B. 2. 
39
For the different usages of the term asylum see Roman Boed (n 1). 
40
 UNHCR ' Note on determination of refugee status under international instruments' (24 August 1977). 
41
 See Chapter III Section i, infra. 
42
 Tratado de Derecho Penal Internacional, (adopted 23 January 1889, entered into force for each Party on the 
date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, as per article 47), depositaries: República Oriental del Uruguay 
and República Argentina. 
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sobre Asilo)
43
, the 1933 Convention on Political Asylum (Convención sobre Asilo Político)
44
, 
the 1939 Treaty on Political Asylum and Refuge (Tratado sobre Asilo Político y Refugio)
45
 
and the 1954 Convention on Diplomatic Asylum (Convención sobre Asilo Diplomático)
46
, all 
of which are still in effect
47
. Although the practice of diplomatic/political asylum has been 
studied by the United Nations, it has considered it abandoned in general international law
48
 
and there have been no further discussions about it in the universal regime
49
. It is therefore 
clear that diplomatic asylum is actively used only in Latin America, where it coexists with 
territorial asylum. 
 
This coexistence has been far from peaceful. At the inception of the universal 
instruments, States refrained from embracing International Refugee Law wholeheartedly due 
to their preference for their own regional figure
50
 and when they did they were often confused 
by the way both regimes interacted
51
. This is partly due to the fact that the universal regime 
was initially perceived as a European response to European issues – an assertion supported by 
Article 1 – that would impose unwanted international oversight over a local institution52 that 
States considered more than adequate
53
. Although over time the universal system has become 
prevalent in the region, political/diplomatic asylum still exists, and instruments continued to 
be drafted even after the adoption of the 1951 Convention
54
. This coexistence has led to two 
direct consequences that have hindered the effectiveness of territorial asylum in the region. 
 
The first consequence is the existence of a grave situation of terminological - and 
therefore legal - confusion. While official UNHCR documents in Spanish use the word 
‘asilo’ (asylum) in its international sense, authors, Latin American States – and in some 
limited instances, regional UNHCR documents – use the word ‘refugio’ (‘refuge’) to refer to 
asylum derived from the universal instruments, reserving the term ‘asilo’ for diplomatic 
                                                 
43
 Convención sobre Asilo (adopted 20 February 1928, entered into force 21 May 1929) 132 LNTS 323. 
44
 Convención sobre Asilo Político (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into force 28 March 1935) 34 OASTS. 
45
 Tratado sobre Asilo Político y Refugio (adopted 8 April 1939, entered into force for each country on the date 
of deposit of its instrument of ratification as per article 18), depositary: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de 
Uruguay. 
46
 Convención sobre Asilo Diplomático (adopted 28 March 1954, entered into force 29 December 1954) 18 
OASTS. 
47
 Galindo Vélez (n 38) 193. 
48
  UNGA, ‘Question of diplomatic asylum: Report of the Secretary-General’ UN GAOR Thirtieth session UN 
Doc A/10139 (1975). 
49
 UNGA Res 3497 (XXX) (15 December 1975), in Galindo Vélez (n 38). On the topic of the rejection of 
diplomatic asylum by most States see Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The refugee in international law (Clarendon Press 
1983), 102. 
50
 Jaime Esponda, ‘La tradición Latinoamericana de asilo y la protección internacional de los refugiados’ in 
UNHCR, El asilo y la protección internacional de los refugiados en América Latina (Siglo XXI 2003). Other 
authors have highlighted the roots of this institution in Spanish and European practice, which then continued to 
evolve in a different direction in Latin America. Leonardo Franco (ed.), El asilo y la protección internacional de 
los refugiados en América Latina: Análisis crítico del dualismo ‘asilo-refugio’ a la luz del Derecho 
Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (ACNUR 2004). 
51
 See, for example, the confusion in the Colombian submission noted by the ICJ in Colombian-Peruvian 
Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 1950 12. 
52
 Leonardo Franco and Jorge Santistevan de Noriega, ‘La contribución del proceso de Cartagena al desarrollo 
del Derecho Internacional de Refugiados en America Latina’ in ACNUR, La protección internacional de 
refugiados en las Américas (n 38) 107. 
53
 Eduardo Arboleda, ‘El ACNUR, las migraciones internacionales y el derecho de asilo y refugio’, [1994]1 
Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior 144. 
54
 See the 1954 Convention (n 46). 
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asylum.
55
 This has been the source of great confusion in the region and has debilitated 
international protection, leading even to cases where States deny protection to refugees 
alleging that regional human rights instruments only regulate ‘diplomatic asylum’ instead of 
asylum as a genus that covers different forms of protection.
56
 
 
The second, and most important consequence, is that territorial asylum was largely 
integrated into the existing structure for adjudicating diplomatic asylum. Of course, a central 
characteristic of this form of protection is that it is granted through the authority of the 
MOFA, giving diplomatic authorities a central role in the process. This would very clearly 
explain why Latin American States hold on to the authority of their Ministries for all forms of 
asylum, and also shows how international protection in the region has maintained its 
correspondence with diplomatic interests. This particular topic will be explored in section iii 
of this Chapter.  
 
This junction was noted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Colombian-
Peruvian Asylum Case
57
 and in its Interpretation of that judgment, known as the Haya de la 
Torre Case
58
. In its decisions, the Court was highly critical of the practice, noting that the 
regime governing it was unstable and permeated by political interests:  
 
The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and 
contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic 
asylum and in the official views expressed on various occasions, there has been so 
much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by 
some States and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much influenced by 
considerations of political expediency in the various cases (…).59 
 
The Court’s comments clearly underline the political – as opposed to juridical – 
nature of a decision to grant diplomatic asylum. It further noted that ‘considerations of 
convenience or simple political expediency seem to have led the territorial State to recognize 
asylum without that decision being dictated by any feeling of legal obligation’, and that 
‘asylum as practised in Latin America is an institution which, to a very great extent, owes its 
development to extra-legal factors’60.  
 
Current commentators have also maintained their criticism of this institution, going so 
far as to say that it has long been proven to be ineffective for international protection
61
 and 
that in practice it is applied with no consideration to regional human rights standards
62
. 
                                                 
55
 César Walter San Juan and Mark Manly,  ‘El asilo y la protección internacional de los refugiados en América 
Latina: análisis crítico del dualismo “asilo-refugio” a la luz del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos 
Humanos’, in Franco (ed.), El asilo y la protección internacional de los refugiados en América Latina: Análisis 
crítico del dualismo ‘asilo-refugio’ a la luz del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (n 50) 36-44.  
56
 Ibid. The authors refer to Venezuela’s claim before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the 
Jesús Pinilla Camacho y Otros vs. Venezuela case. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Annual 
report 2001’ (16 April 2002) OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114 doc. 5 rev., para. 61. 
57
 Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case (n 51). 
58
 Haya de la Torre Case (Colombia v Peru) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 1951. 
59
 Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case (n 51). 
60
 Ibid, 24. 
61
 San Juan and Manly (n 55). 
62
 Mark Manly, ‘La consagración del asilo como un derecho humano: Análisis comparativo de la Declaración 
Universal, la Declaración Americana y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos’ in Franco (ed.), El 
asilo y la protección internacional de los refugiados en América Latina: Análisis crítico del dualismo ‘asilo-
refugio’ a la luz del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, 158-159. 
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Therefore, when the decision-maker in diplomatic asylum is the same as in territorial asylum 
the mind-set behind this extra-legal process is maintained and its flaws are readily transmitted 
and reproduced. 
 
Overall, although some authors have considered that the coexistence of both forms of 
protection in Latin America is a positive factor in expanding the margins of international 
protection
63
, it is difficult to see how they are compatible, at least when both have the same 
adjudicator, for two main reasons. 
 
First, the two institutions have very different objectives that render them 
incompatible. Diplomatic asylum is an exceptional measure that seeks to protect select 
individuals in positions of power in their country
64
, while territorial asylum can potentially 
cover any individual. Therefore, while the mind-set behind diplomatic asylum might serve to 
protect a handful of high-profile individuals each year, it cannot properly address the needs of 
a region where displacement is massive
65
 and disproportionately affects those in the most 
vulnerable circumstances
66
. 
 
Secondly, treating all asylum-seekers as if they were applying for diplomatic asylum 
is extremely prejudicial to their cases, as there is a considerable difference in the availability 
of evidence. While individuals who opt for diplomatic asylum are by definition in prominent 
positions in society, making their accounts more easily verifiable, refugees often escape with 
very little and are usually from less privileged backgrounds, which makes access to evidence 
much more difficult
67
. Therefore, asking the majority of claimants (who are presumptive 
refugees) to reach the standard of proof expected of an ‘asylee’ (the minority) exposes them 
to unfair treatment. However, even this is a minor issue compared to concerns regarding 
partiality, which will be explored in the next section. 
 
This does not mean that there is no place for diplomatic asylum in Latin America, as 
both institutions have different purposes that may ultimately serve to give protection to 
different groups and overlap only in few cases. However, they do not operate under the same 
logic, and therefore cannot operate under the same adjudicator, as this strips territorial asylum 
of its juridical and apolitical nature.  
 
ii. The impact of the decision-maker in the outcome of the case  
 
As noted earlier, Group A and Group B States in Latin America either determine all 
territorial asylum claims within their Ministries of Foreign Affairs or in ad hoc committees 
that include them in a prominent role. This section will set out to demonstrate that since the 
identity of the decision-maker plays a large role in the outcome of a case, having a diplomatic 
authority adjudicating asylum claims will directly impact the outcome of individual cases.  
                                                 
63
 Esponda (n 50). 
64
 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, ‘Informe anual 1981-1982’ (20 September 1982) 
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65
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(adopted 2 November 1984). 
66
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67
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Indeed, the influence of the decision-maker on the outcome of like cases is a 
prominent research area in the general issue of consistency in adjudication in the field of 
forced migration studies.
68
 Reviews have found that in many jurisdictions the question of 
whether two individuals with an identical claim receive the same decision is largely up to 
who makes that decision.  
 
Empirical studies in consistency in Latin America are extremely difficult, as States, 
unlike those in Europe and North America, don’t publish detailed figures on asylum claims69, 
and do not have systems in place to publish statistically significant quantities of anonymized 
decisions from first instance decision-makers
70
 or tribunals
71
. Additionally, since these issues 
are within the competence of diplomatic authorities, oversight from UNHCR
72
 is constrained 
by having to communicate with a diplomatic – as opposed to a technical – counterpart. Since 
UNHCR engages in a diplomatic relation with the decision-maker it has to avoid actions that 
could provide more information on the subject but might jeopardize this relationship, such as 
supporting calls for public disclosure of asylum figures, as they might be construed as 
criticism
73
. All of this leads to a vast lack of information that makes studying this subject 
extremely complicated. 
 
In any case, even if no studies of this sort have been conducted in Latin America due 
to these reasons, studies in other regions have shown that the impact of the decision-maker in 
the decision is undeniable. If this occurs in independent systems with high level of technical 
capacity, it can also be said to occur in systems where the adjudicator is not independent
74
 
and where officials show very little technical proficiency
75
. 
 
For instance, comparing similar cases of a same country of origin in 2010 (China) in 
the New York, Newark and Los Angeles asylum offices, grant rates span the whole range 
between almost 0% to 99% between offices and among caseworkers within a same office. 
Similar data is available for Albanian claimants before New York Immigration Court judges 
(5 to 96%) and Colombian claimants before Miami Immigration Court judges (5-88%)
76
, 
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with other evidence of adjudicator bias having been compiled since at least 1990
77
. Different 
jurisdictions among Swiss cantons also exhibit the same variance in grant rates
78
. 
 
Even in supranational systems with common substantive and procedural criteria for 
decision-making there are very notable differences in grant rates in similar cases. The 
obvious example is the Common European Asylum System
79
 (CEAS), under which 
recognition rates vary widely, and similar cases from a specific country are alternatively 
accepted or rejected in variations of extreme statistical significance. For example, data for 
2010 indicates that in deciding like cases from Afghanistan the grant rate for subsidiary 
protection under Article 15C of the European Qualification Directive
80
 (indiscriminate 
violence) ranges from 51% in Sweden and 24.5% in the Netherlands to 1.1% in France, 0.3% 
in Germany and 0.2% in the United Kingdom
81
. Similar examples concerning applicants from 
Iraq, Somalia and Libya have also been offered by other authors
82
. 
 
Evidently, pinpointing the exact reason for variation among like cases is extremely 
complicated, as it can be attributed to a plethora of different factors related to the applicant
83
, 
including age and gender
84
, and to other factors such access to adequate legal counsel or lack 
thereof
85
, the expertise of the decision-maker on a particular region
86
 or the quality of 
available Country of Origin Information (COI)
87
, among many others
88
. However, research is 
consistent in indicating that when controlling for other factors, large degrees of variation can 
be attributed to who makes the decision.
89
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The existence of unfair procedures in other countries does not excuse maintaining the 
current situation in Latin America. As the next section demonstrates, even if partiality is 
evident in many systems, the situation in Group A and B States is particularly grave, as 
asylum-seekers before a diplomatic authority face an especially partial procedure that is 
significantly more imbalanced and that further undermines individual rights. While partiality 
may never be completely eliminated from asylum adjudication, it is clear that States have a 
positive obligation to reduce it as much as possible, as discussed in Chapter V. 
 
Having established that who the decision-maker is plays a role in the outcome of a 
case, it is clear that the fact that adjudication is carried out by diplomatic authorities has a 
direct impact on the decision. Indeed, it is absolutely evident that due to their position these 
individuals direct their actions towards the promotion of the object of the office, which is to 
be ‘responsible for the conduct of his or her State's relations with all other States’90. This duty 
is not compatible with protecting individuals who have fled their homes either because their 
State has violated their basic rights or because it has failed to prevent others from doing so. 
The ensuing conflict of interest is necessarily solved against the asylum-seeker, resulting in 
unfair decision-making. 
 
iii. The role of foreign policy in the outcome of individual cases 
 
The analysis has shown that a decision-maker like that in Groups A and B States 
unsurprisingly prioritises foreign policy considerations over protection concerns, as it is in 
the nature of a MOFA and its delegates to consider the diplomatic impact of decisions. 
However, foreign policy itself also plays a role in determining State responses to asylum 
requests even in countries with independent decision-makers. In the case of the States 
studied, the effects of both situations are compounded to the detriment of asylum-seekers, 
creating a state of partiality that is far worse than that faced by asylum-seekers in other 
regions. 
 
In theory, the act of granting territorial asylum should not be a cause for diplomatic 
frictions between the host State and the State of origin. The 1951 Convention expressed ‘the 
wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of 
refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a 
cause of tension between States’91. In that sense, the General Assembly also stressed that the 
granting of asylum could not be regarded as unfriendly
92
, as a finding that persecution is 
occurring in another State does not constitute interference or censure upon it
93
, a conclusion 
echoed by Latin American States in the - nonbinding - Cartagena Declaration
94
. Indeed, one 
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of the main reasons behind having a unified international refugee definition was avoiding 
foreign policy concerns in national systems.
95
  
 
However, this seems to be little more than a legal fiction. As other authors have noted, 
States ‘do not formulate their asylum policies in a political vacuum’, and asylum decisions 
are sometimes part of a ‘broader political calculus’96. Some authors have gone as far as to 
stress that ‘the pursuit by States of their own well-being has been the greatest factor shaping 
the international legal response to refugees since World War II’97.  
   
The fact that foreign policy interests generally guide State decisions is self-evident. In 
the specific case of asylum adjudication, however, a larger degree of insulation from outside 
influence should be expected in order to protect the nature of asylum as a non-political act, 
but this is rarely the case. Indeed, a look at the major trends in asylum in both industrialised 
and developing States evidences a clear link between foreign policy goals and asylum 
adjudication, but Latin America faces issues of partiality that are above and beyond those in 
other regions due to the fact that its diplomatic bodies are in charge of adjudicating asylum 
claims.  
 
This correlation generally operates in a predictable manner: regardless of the merits of 
their individual cases, asylum-seekers from rival States have a better chance of receiving 
asylum, while asylum-seekers from friendly States have a smaller chance of receiving 
protection.
98
 In this scenario, foreign policy ‘overwhelm(s) humanitarian concerns’99 in 
violation of the non-discrimination clause of the 1951 Convention
100
.  
 
In the first case, asylum-seekers benefit from poor relations between their State of 
origin and their host State regardless of the merits of their individual case, a trend that saw its 
peak during the Cold War. In the case of the United States, this policy began after World War 
II
101
 and was later enshrined in the Immigration and Nationality Act from 1952 to 1980, 
which defined a refugee as an individual ‘from a Communist dominated country or area, or 
from any country within the general area of the Middle East’102. It was later continued, with 
some changes, by the 1980 reforms.
103
 Most notably, this policy benefited individuals from 
China, the Soviet Union
104
 and Cubans, for whom very favourable rules for being granted 
                                                 
95
 Gregg A. Beyer, ‘Reforming affirmative asylum processing in the United States: Challenges and opportunities 
[1994] 9 (4) Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 43, 59. 
96
 James H. S. Milner, Refugees, the State and the politics of asylum in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan 2009), 161. 
97
 Hathaway, ‘A reconsideration of the underlying premise of refugee law’ (n 21) 133. See also B. Martin 
Tsamenyi, 'The "boat people": are they refugees?' [1983] 5 (3) HRQ 348. 
98
 Atle Grahl-Madsen, 'International refugee law today and tomorrow' [1982] 20 Archiv des Völkerrechts 411, 
421; Gorlick (n 15) 5.  
99
 Tahl Tyson, ‘The Refugee Act of 1980: Suggested reforms in the Overseas Refugee Program to safeguard 
humanitarian concerns from competing interests’ [1990] 65 Wash. L. Rev. 921 in Musalo, Moore and Boswell (n 
125) 82. See also Stephen H. Legomsky, ‘An asylum seeker’s bill of rights in a non-utopian world’ [2000] 14 
Geo. Immigr. L. J. 619. 
100
 Article 3 outlines the obligation to apply the content of the Convention ‘without discrimination as to race, 
religion or country of origin’.   
101
 Kathryn M. Bockley, ‘A historical overview of refugee legislation: The deception of foreign policy in the 
land of promise’ [1995] 21 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 253. 
102
 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (Pub. L. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163), Section 203(a)(7). 
103
 Tyson (n 98) 81. See also Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated kindness: Refugees and America's 
half-open door, 1945 to the present (The Free Press 1986). 
104
 Julie Mertus, ‘The State and the post-Cold War refugee regime: New models, new questions’ [1998] 20 
Mich. J. Int'l L. 59. 
16 
 
asylum were enacted with the interest of weakening or discrediting communist regimes
105
, an 
objective also pursued by authorities in Europe and Australia
106
. 
 
As a result, Cubans enjoyed higher recognition rates than individuals with similar 
cases from non-communist States
107
 and easily accessed US territory, a fact that Castro took 
advantage of to get rid of ‘undesirables’ during the Mariel boatlift108. Likewise, Iranian109 and 
Nicaraguan
110
 nationals also enjoyed a high probability of being protected independently of 
the strength of their individual claims. Granting territorial asylum in an unjustified manner to 
satisfy political whims is undesirable, as it drains political and financial resources that could 
be better used to protect legitimate claimants from grave risks to their well-being. 
 
At the same time, individuals who flee friendly States are systematically denied 
asylum
111, as ‘this could undermine relations by constituting public criticism of the regime’112 
or implicating it in committing human rights violations
113
, a situation which has also been 
noted by UNHCR
114
. This was the case of Chileans fleeing the Pinochet dictatorship to the 
United Kingdom, who had their claims rejected due to the good relationship between both 
countries
115
. The same occurred in the United States during the Cold War, when it rejected 
asylum-seekers persecuted by repressive regimes
116
 that it did not wish to criticize
117
. For 
example, ninety eight percent of applicants from Guatemala, Haiti and El Salvador
118
 were 
rejected by the U.S. asylum system despite many of them having strong claims
119
. The fact 
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that this was the result of an official policy
120
 has been confirmed by former officials of the 
Immigration and Nationalization Service
121
, and led to litigation where the courts noted the 
conflict between diplomatic and humanitarian interests
122
. 
 
A third minor trend sees States pursue asylum policies that are not necessarily in 
favour or against a specific State, but rather seek to promote a particular foreign interest. One 
such example is the United States’ admission of large numbers of refugees from Hungary in 
the 1950s and post-war Vietnam as a way to repair the damaged it had caused through its 
interventions in both territories.
123
 
 
Some more recent studies in industrialised States have noted the scarcity of empirical 
evidence linking foreign policy and asylum
124
 and have not focused on the nature of the 
diplomatic relation between two States, but only on its formal existence
125
. It is indeed true 
that the end of the Cold War also brought the end of the main reason for politicizing asylum. 
However, the issue has not disappeared, as other studies have found that it persists in other 
sophisticated forms
126
, noting, among others, the case of Afghan and Iraqi applicants in the 
U.S. after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the Iraq War in 2003
127
.  
 
In this scenario, the foreign policy goal has been to prove that the security situation in 
these countries has improved due to the American intervention, which is demonstrated by 
showing that their nationals have no need for international protection.
128
 In the same manner, 
the promotion of economic ties with trade partners has also played an important role in 
asylum adjudication in the United States in recent years.
129
 Other similarly sophisticated 
trends have been evidenced in the Caribbean
130
 and Africa
131
. 
 
Does this mean that granting asylum is an unavoidably political act? Some writers 
think this may be so. Price, for instance, has characterised asylum as inherently “expressive”, 
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in the sense that by granting or denying it a State expresses its approval or disapproval 
towards the State of origin.
132
 While he recognises the dangers of this character – no 
protection for nationals from friendly States, undue protection for nationals of hostile States, 
and smaller States fearing protecting those who flee stronger States – he considers that this 
carries advantages in letting the State of origin know that its actions are not welcome by the 
international community and that stronger sanctions may follow
133
, which would be a soft 
form of international oversight on human rights.  
 
Although in reality this expressive character does seem to exist, and there is indeed a 
tension between well-meaning efforts to provide protection and comply with international 
agreements and ‘the sometimes narrow self-interest calculations of sovereign nation 
states’134, this theory does not account for other more specific foreign policy goals that may 
also be promoted through asylum
135
. But, most of all, this excessive realpolitik seems to 
forget that the purpose and object of asylum is to provide protection to individuals, so using it 
to send a message to other States is not only ‘a fruitless task’136, but also objectifies the 
asylum-seeker and exposes him to national and international interests he or she is not 
responsible of and cannot control.  
 
This analysis clearly shows that even in jurisdictions with strong and independent 
authorities adjudicating asylum claims there is a chance that foreign policy influences 
decisions
137
. It is also undeniable that, to a large degree, political interests have permeated 
refugee protection throughout its history.
138
 Therefore, asylum adjudication can probably 
never be completely apolitical, but it is possible to insulate the process and reduce political 
influence to a minimum. 
 
The reforms to the asylum system in the United States to eliminate the role of the 
Department of State and reform the role of the Department of Justice
139
 and strengthen 
independent and well-informed decision-making
140
 are, to a degree, good models to follow. If 
some degree of political influence in adjudication is unavoidable, then States have a duty to 
control other factors in order to reduce it as much as possible. In Latin America, however, 
they have done precisely the opposite. 
Foreign policy in Latin America 
 
In the particular case of Latin America, illustrating the link between foreign policy 
and asylum adjudication is a more complicated task due to the aforementioned difficulties in 
conducting research into asylum adjudication trends in the region
141
. In order to corroborate 
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existing evidence and produce original research, during the course of this investigation the 
most prominent NGOs and academic centres working with asylum-seekers in these countries 
were contacted and asked for their observations on the subject. Several institutions declined 
to participate, with some of them noting the need to avoid antagonizing the adjudicator. 
Those in Ecuador, Brazil, Mexico and Costa Rica replied, providing a representative sample, 
as they include all of the countries that receive the highest proportion of asylum-seekers in 
the region with the exception of Argentina
142
.  
 
All of them confirmed the hypothesis that asylum adjudication in these States takes 
into account foreign policy concerns, and further noted that the issue might be more prevalent 
than they are able to note, as poorly motivated decisions make it difficult to know what the 
reasons behind a decision really are. The findings from this research are included in this 
section along with the literature review for these and other countries. 
 
Although information on a regional level is scarce, the Inter-American Commission 
for Human Rights was already reporting in 1982 that ‘many’ States were not receiving 
refugees for political or ideological reasons
143
. More recently, UNHCR officials from the 
Regional Legal Unit have noted – in a personal capacity – that the adjudication of diplomatic 
asylum by MOFAs is not adequate in the light of universal and regional human rights 
standards
144
. Considering that in these States MOFAs are also responsible for the 
adjudication of refugee status and complementary protection claims, the same conclusion can 
be reached in this case.   
 
Furthermore, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in the field have 
recently documented this practice in the region, and noted that diplomatic involvement in 
decision-making is contrary to due process in general and impartiality in particular, raising 
the issue in collaborative regional studies
145
 and before UNHCR’s Executive Committee 
(EXCOM)
146
. 
 
As in other regions, foreign policy considerations follow two major trends and one 
minor one. The first trend is rejecting asylum-seekers to avoid antagonising friendly States, 
and is the prevailing trend in the countries studied. Much less prevalent is using asylum to 
antagonize rival States, but it has a very clear example in the Snowden case, which has been 
described earlier in this article
147
. A third interesting trend is to use protection to promote 
very specific foreign policy objectives, which go beyond causing an effect in a particular 
State and generally seek to promote the country’s standing in the international arena. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142
 Reed-Hurtado (n 75) 5. 
143
 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, ‘Informe anual 1981-1982’ (20 September 1982) 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57 doc. 6 rev.1, Cap. VI B. 9. 
144
 Manly (n 62) 158-159. 
145
 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants and Asylum Access, Refugee Status Determination in 
Latin America: Regional Challenges & Opportunities [2013]. 
146
 UNHCR EXCOM, ‘NGO Statement on the Americas – Extended Version’ (5-7 March 2013). The author of 
this paper contributed to the drafting of this statement. 
147
 See Introduction, supra. 
20 
 
Safeguarding relations with other states 
 
Avoiding antagonising friendly States is the most common case of diplomatic 
interference in asylum adjudication in the region. In the case of Ecuador, along the MOFA’s 
comments on how his office would take into account its relation with the US in the Snowden 
case –  described at the beginning of this paper –, research conducted with the collaboration 
of the local branch of a global NGO reveals that its relationship with Cuba leads the 
Ecuadorean State to consider it a safe country, which in turn causes a systematic rejection of 
Cuban asylum-seekers
148
. In fact, prejudice and even open hostility against Cuban asylum-
seekers is now widespread among Ecuadoreans and is largely tolerated or ignored by the 
authorities, who diminish their needs for protection, believing most Cubans are only 
economic migrants.
149
 A similar situation is also observable in Nicaragua. Due to a strong 
common history and ideological affinity, diplomatic ties between Cuba and Nicaragua have 
prompted the latter to take a politicized approach towards Cuban asylum-seekers, causing 
their claims to be systematically rejected.
150
 
 
In Colombia, regional studies have noted that conducting adjudication through its 
MOFA violates the guarantee of impartiality
151
, a finding that has been confirmed by rulings 
by the country’s High Courts. The judgments have repeatedly chastised the MOFA for 
claiming that asylum adjudication is discretionary and for issuing poorly motivated 
decisions
152
, which reveals that the adjudicator does indeed believe that it can decide in line 
with its political goals rather than having an obligation to uphold international and national 
regulations. A recent case of an Iranian national before the State Council
153
 also revealed that 
foreign policy concerns are taken into account when Colombia’s ambassadors in the 
claimant’s country of origin are consulted. The discovery of evidence exposed that the 
Colombian Ambassador in Tehran had pressed for the rejection of the case to avoid 
disturbing relations with the Persian State.  
 
Although in Mexico the adjudicatory system relies on less input from the MOFA than 
in other States, its concerns still affect decision-making to a degree. One particular case has 
been recently brought to light with regard to the application of the Cartagena expanded 
refugee definition. An officer noted that 'the definition requires us to qualify a particular 
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situation as one of generalised violence or manifest that a particular country is a gross 
human-rights violator. There are some political considerations. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is vigilant'
154
.  
 
According to a prominent NGO in Mexico, the RSD authority unjustifiably denies 
asylum to individuals of several countries of origin, especially from neighbouring countries 
in Central America
155
. Its comments coincide with those in Reed-Hurtado’s study156, and 
further note that decision-making is affected by the expectations on migratory reform in the 
U.S. and its impact on migrants who are in Mexico en route to that country
157
. 
 
The particular case of Mexico appears to share similarities with the pre-reform system 
in the United States, where Country of Origin Information played a central role in adjusting 
decision-making to foreign policy
158
. In this case, the Department of State promoted its 
interests indirectly by issuing country guidance notes that were strictly followed by decision-
makers. Similar situations occur in Argentina and Brazil, and this interference leads to 
arbitrary application of the law and politicizes international protection.
159
 It seems clear, 
however, that as the Mexican RSD authority strengthens its institutional mandate and internal 
procedures, especially those regarding its own Country of Origin Information system, it will 
be able to be more independent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thereby become 
considerably more impartial. 
 
Extreme caution towards issues that might affect the country’s standing with the 
United States is also observable in Costa Rica. In particular, a local NGO noted that decisions 
are exceedingly political, and in cases of U.S. victims of gender-based violence the 
authorities have proceeded with caution, considering them to be highly controversial.
160
 This 
has led to instances where it has been necessary for the claimants and their supporters to ask 
for the intervention of State agencies for the defence of human and women’s rights to fight 
the adjudicator’s reluctance to grant asylum.161  
 
Harming rival governments  
 
There is very little data on the use of asylum in the region to harm rival States. The 
evidence suggests that there is not enough information to note whether this is a recurring 
practice, but the actions of Bolivia and Venezuela in the Snowden case, described at the 
beginning of this article
162
, clearly show at least one instance where this has occurred. This 
does not mean that this particular claim would not be accepted before an impartial tribunal; 
instead, that the States concerned have recognised that their objective is to affect U.S. 
interests rather than deciding on the merits of the case itself.  
 
Promoting specific foreign policy goals 
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There are at least two specific instances in which asylum policy has been used to promote 
regional or global goals instead of country-specific goals. The specific objective behind this 
practice is to boost the country’s image abroad, which is in line with the more nuanced 
approach that is also present in other regions in recent years
163
. 
 
The first case relates to the protection of Colombians in Ecuador, where NGOs report 
that the improvement of relations between both countries helped the Colombian Government 
further its goals of demonstrating its status as a safe country
164
 and highlighting the advances 
in its peace process
165
. Discussions between both countries prompted legal reforms in 
Ecuador that excluded victims of internal conflict from the expanded refugee definition and 
made temporal restrictions on access to procedures stricter. As a result, recognition rates 
plummeted.
166 
This leaves most Colombians displaced to Ecuador with no resort to 
international protection, and seeks to push them to return to their country even though 
security conditions are still extremely lacking
167
.   
 
The systematic rejection of Colombian asylum-seekers appears to be a strategy to 
promote the image of Colombia as a safe territory, and shows similarities with the case of 
Afghan and Iraqi asylum-seekers in the United States, which was discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Although to this day there has been no official response to this regressive policy, 
UNHCR officials indirectly referred to it the 2013 meeting of the agency’s Standing 
Committee when discussing which protection laws have been made more stringent
168
. This is 
a particularly worrisome development given that Colombian forced migrants in Ecuador are 
one of the biggest populations of concern to UNHCR in the world
169
. 
 
The Brazilian case also appears to show the use of international protection to promote 
its image abroad. Towards this end, the country has granted voluntary protection to Haitians 
that abandoned their homes after the 2010 earthquake. The objective is to promote Brazil’s 
standing in the international community as a force for stability and peace, thereby 
strengthening its case for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.
170
 In 
correspondence, the authors of this study reconfirmed the findings of their research, and 
noted that this decision complements other actions, such as exceptionally active participation 
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in UN peacekeeping missions, as part of a wider strategy to demonstrate Brazil’s importance 
in maintaining international peace and security.
171
  
 
Although it is clear that in this case the foreign policy goal is seemingly serving to 
widen the scope of protection,  this development is still undesirable  If States wish to widen 
the scope of their protection they should adopt generous legal standards, instead of doing so 
only when there are political benefits to reap. Using forced migrants for political gain leaves 
them exposed to the whims of foreign policy that might welcome them one day and reject 
them the next, further eroding consistent and principled decision-making. 
 
It is clear that asylum adjudication and policy in Groups A and B States are directly 
linked to their foreign policy goals. This specific issue is added to other regional 
characteristics that affect impartiality in decision-making, which have been discussed earlier 
in this Chapter. The end result is that individuals face unfair procedures that are much worse 
than those present in other regions, leaving them in a particularly desperate situation. 
IV. International Refugee Law and a human rights perspective 
As this paper has established up to this point, the procedure for asylum adjudication in 
Latin America creates a heightened risk of biased decision-making. Taking into account the 
fact that neither the 1951 Convention nor its Protocol provide explicit guidance on procedural 
matters, does this mean that individuals are abandoned to drown in a particularly vicious 
lacuna of international law? The answer, obviously, is no. International protection has 
evolved on its own and through the influence of other areas of international law, and as a 
result upholding only substantive standards without reference to procedural safeguards is 
insufficient, and the obligation of having an impartial decision-maker is well established.  
 
Indeed, authors have noted that a central characteristic of any protection system is to 
have a qualified, independent and impartial decision-maker.
172
 As a matter of fact, accession 
to the Convention and its Protocol constitute an international commitment to ‘grant asylum 
with impartiality’173, which requires not only impartiality itself but also the appearance of 
impartiality in adjudicators
174
. In the words of Goodwin-Gill, the very definition of refugee 
‘supposes a dispassionate case-by-case examination’175. 
 
As the organisation charged with overseeing the implementation of the universal 
instruments
176
, UNHCR’s interpretation, although nonbinding, holds a privileged role in 
determining their content
177
. In this context, the Agency has been especially active in pushing 
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the development of international standards by promoting fair asylum procedures
178
, having 
branded impartial protection a central tenet of human dignity
179
. More importantly, its own 
Executive Committee, composed of States Parties to the universal instruments, has reiterated 
throughout decades of work that asylum procedures should be ‘fair’180. In this context, as it 
hasn’t been given a distinct meaning, the term ‘fair’ can only be understood in its common 
use, that is, ‘treating people equally without favouritism or discrimination’ in a way that 
is ‘just or appropriate in the circumstances’181. 
 
Therefore, it is evident at this point that the Convention itself offers basic guarantees 
against partial decision-making. But beyond that, Article 5 establishes that ‘nothing in this 
Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State 
to refugees apart from this Convention’. Therefore, the rights of refugees are also guaranteed 
by other instruments, and where their content is different, the most beneficial provision and 
interpretation should apply under the pro homine principle
182
, and can serve to fill the 
lacunae in the refugee instruments
183
. UNHCR itself has promoted this view, underscoring 
‘the obligation to treat asylum-seekers and refugees in accordance with applicable human 
rights and refugee law standards as set out in relevant international instruments’184.  
 
The basis of applying human rights law to refugees is the fact that most basic rights 
are guaranteed to everyone regardless of their nationality.
185
 Indeed, the general rule is that a 
State has to respect the rights of all individuals within its jurisdiction.
186
 Consequently, as 
foreigners asylum-seekers are recognized basic rights
187
, including the right to a fair trial as 
contained in Article 14
188
 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
189
. 
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Despite its name, the right to a fair trial is not limited to judicial procedures, but is in reality a 
right to due process, as it also applies to adjudicatory proceedings of a non-judicial nature
190
, 
including refugee status determination procedures
191
.  
 
Within this general right there is a specific duty to maintain impartiality in 
adjudicatory procedures. When applied to asylum adjudication, impartiality is both a central 
requirement of due process
192
 and the principal means to assess how just the system is
193
. 
Additionally, as asylum claims often occur in the context of expulsion or deportation 
processes, they are also covered by their specific requirement of having and independent and 
impartial adjudicator
194
. 
 
Overall, the impartiality requirement mandates that in every case ‘the body before 
which refugees are entitled to present their claims must be… independent and impartial’195. 
In that sense, Legomsky’s observation on the application of International Human Rights law 
to this issue acutely notes the relevant issues: 
 
It seems an elementary principle of justice that the adjudicator should base the 
findings of fact on his or her honest reading of the evidence and the legal conclusions 
on his or her honest interpretation of the law… No one is free of all biases, but a fair 
adjudication system takes steps to minimize them. One long settled principle, 
therefore, is that the adjudicator must not have a stake in the outcome of the case.
196
  
 
The universal human rights regime, which is fully applicable in Latin American 
States, establishes a clear obligation to have an impartial asylum adjudicator. Therefore, by 
subordinating decision-making to foreign policy interests, Group A and B States are plainly in 
breach of this obligation, and should reform their systems in order to correct this situation. 
This duty is also strengthened by regional human rights commitments that point in the same 
direction. 
 
Due process and impartiality in Latin America 
 
Latin American States are also bound by regional instruments that further stress their 
obligation to provide impartial decision-makers in asylum claims. The Inter-American 
Human Rights system has a long tradition of dealing with this subject and has developed a 
strong background on the protection of forced migrants. The premise behind this system is 
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that equality under the law has reached jus cogens status
197
, and as a result basic rights are 
afforded to every individual under a State Party’s ‘authority and control’ regardless of their 
nationality
198
 or migratory status
199
. 
 
These guarantees include the right to a fair trial contained in Article 8 of the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights
200
, which, like its universal counterpart, is more 
accurately described as a right to due process, and is likewise not limited to judicial 
procedures, but applies to any matter of a ‘materially jurisdictional nature’ – including 
administrative procedures – that determines individual rights and obligations201. The 
obligation to respect it during asylum adjudication is well established
202
 and has been 
recognized by States themselves
203
. 
 
The guarantee of fairness includes specific provisions regarding the right to an 
independent and impartial decision-maker.
204
 The Inter-American system has expanded the 
scope of this element by stating that the adjudicator not only has to be strictly impartial, but 
‘must (also) appear to act without being subject to influences, incentives, pressures, threats, 
or interference’205, and ‘offer sufficient objective guarantees to exclude any doubt the parties 
or the community might entertain as to his or her lack of impartiality’206.  
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When applying this guarantee to asylum procedures, the Commission has noted that 
‘safeguards include the right to have one’s eligibility to enter the process decided by a 
competent, independent and impartial decision-maker, through a process which is fair and 
transparent’207. It has also highlighted the special importance of procedural safeguards in the 
context of asylum due to the difficulties that are inherent to it and the pre-eminence of the 
obligation of non-refoulement
208
, and stated that the duty of impartiality is directly linked to 
consistency in decision-making, as ‘the basic principles of equal protection and due process 
reflected in the American Declaration require predictable procedures and consistency in 
decision-making at each stage of the process’209.  
 
The Inter-American Court itself recently decided its first case regarding asylum-
seekers, Pacheco Tineo v. Bolivia
210
. The Court largely reiterated its jurisprudence on due 
process and followed the Commission’s arguments in previous asylum cases, reiterating that, 
as asylum-seekers are under the State’s jurisdiction, it must safeguard their right to due 
process in resolving asylum claims and other procedures that might entail their removal from 
its territory
211
. This includes interviewing the asylum-seeker and making a fair and unbiased 
decision on the merits of the case as per EXCOM Conclusion 8(2) on minimum standards
212
. 
Due to this precedent, decision-making is especially important, as the Court recognized that 
under regional instruments applicants have an individual right to receive asylum when they 
fulfil the requirements of the refugee definition
213
. As such, granting asylum is not 
discretionary, so States have a duty to make sure that all procedures are foreseeable, coherent, 
and objective, in order to avoid arbitrary decisions.
214
 
 
In conclusion, the international human rights regime applicable in Latin America very 
clearly indicates that asylum processes should follow strict requirements of impartiality. 
Findings in previous chapters, however, have shown that foreign policy plays a central role in 
the provision of asylum, eliminating any possibility of fairness. In that sense, these countries 
have failed in their stated commitment to strengthen refugee protection through other 
branches of International Law, especially human rights law
215
. 
V. Conclusions 
The overview of this situation is grim. Asylum-seekers, who are already one of the 
most vulnerable populations anywhere, are subject to extreme conditions of partiality in Latin 
America that are above and beyond those present in other regions. This preliminary study, 
which can only ever be completed in the framework of full cooperation and disclosure from 
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the States involved, strives to provide the legal and factual basis for understanding that the 
current status is unacceptable and point the way towards a solution. 
 
The answer to this issue is political will, but adherence to international law can 
provide a sound starting point. Indeed, as this situation clearly indicates a violation of 
individual rights in breach of international commitments, the basic rules of international 
responsibility apply. In this sense, this breach creates a new obligation: the responsibility to 
put an end to it
216
. 
 
The process through which this can be achieved is fairly straightforward. States must 
transfer asylum adjudication to technical, independent and impartial authorities that are free 
from interference from their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Evidently, this is easier said than 
done, as the very fact that States have insisted in using asylum as a foreign policy tool for so 
long clearly indicates that they have an interest in maintaining the status quo.  
 
However, they might be encouraged to consider reform. If they are interested in 
promoting their image as humanitarian nations
217
, they may do so by promoting generous, 
transparent, fair and consistent standards that do not risk unfair adjudication in individual 
cases. Likewise, if their goal is fostering stable and harmonious relations with other States, 
having truly independent adjudicatory bodies can shield them from diplomatic repercussions 
stemming from individual decisions
218
, something they cannot do with the current regime.  
 
In this process frank feedback from UNHCR is crucial, as its experience in decision-
making and in supporting the establishment of national systems can help reach successful 
outcomes. As an added benefit, if adjudication is transferred to an independent body the 
Agency and its partners can engage national authorities on a technical - rather than political - 
level, helping them build a system that is not only fair but also efficient, which is also in the 
interest of States themselves. 
 
Alternatively, civil society and academia could and should rise to the challenge if 
change does not come from within governments. They should not be afraid to denounce the 
arbitrariness of this system and question it before national and international organisms and 
courts. Latin American lawyers are increasingly becoming more skilled in using international 
law to solve local issues and this is a prime example of a situation where smart legal work 
can make a huge difference for vulnerable communities across the Americas. 
 
Evidently, establishing independent decision-makers cannot guarantee perfect 
outcomes, especially if it is not followed by further reforms, such as promoting real access to 
truly independent judicial review
219
 and setting high standards for motivation in decisions
220
. 
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Projects such as the Quality Assurance Initiative
221
 can play an important role in improving 
adjudication and can make structural changes more effective. However, as it is clear that the 
role of MOFAs in decision-making is a central factor in preventing fair access to asylum in 
the region, providing access to an adjudicator that is properly insulated from foreign policy 
considerations will go a long way towards promoting the rights of asylum-seekers.  
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